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Summary
One hundred years ago air transport started as a technical challenge. Once the enchantment
was over, the practical advantages were swiftly recognised, providing privileges for the affluent.
Due to the inherent dangers and the early mishaps, a self-improving safety system evolved. The
safety of current air transport testifies to the success of this approach.
The current business trend is the integration of independent companies into an Internet
based virtual enterprise, delivering seamless customer support. As air transport has become a
commodity, these service-based architecture techniques will be applied. The impact of the
myriad, not harmonised safety rules on such integrated software will be discussed.
Recently security concerns have risen. It is described how the common criteria could
provide a framework for systematic application of security to software.
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1 Introduction
Nearly one century after the first powered flight the need for a quantum leap in air transport
improvement became apparent on both sides of the ocean. The European vision for 2020 [1]
states “an air transport system responding to society’s needs despite a three-fold increase in air
traffic because aircraft are cleaner, safer, quieter and air traffic is efficiently managed”. The
imperatives are safer, cleaner and quieter (in this order) resulting in stated goals including a
five-fold reduction in the average accident rate, a seamless European Air Traffic Management
(ATM) system, integration of air transport into an efficient multimodal transport system and
halving the time-to-market for new products.
In the US the Anyone, Anything, Anytime, Anywhere vision [2] states a number of
breakthrough capabilities including, tripling air transport capacity by 2025, reducing fatal
accident rate by 90%, reducing aircraft noise and emissions by 90% and reducing time-to-
market from decades/years to months/weeks. Information Technology (IT) tops the list of
potential breakthrough enablers. Reducing the time-to-market requires solving the airborne
equipage problems. As the current certification process remains a major issue [2] proposes a
paradigm shift.
This paper shows how an actual project, predating these vision documents, tries to combine
innovative IT concurrent enterprise concepts with ATM practises to address the challenges
mentioned above. Based on some observations of the European COOPATS (Co-operative Air
Traffic Services) concept chapter 2 proposes a prototype infrastructure as realised in the TALIS
project. Given the ambitious safety objectives, safety will become even more important, so
chapter3 discusses current certification practises. Chapter 4 summarises the findings.
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2 Air transport innovation
2.1 New ATM concepts
In busy airspace the current working methods are approaching their limits, resulting in safe
but uneconomical flight execution with delays on the ground and in the air. The current ATM
concept certainly cannot cope with the three-fold increase required by [1] and [2]. To improve
this situation the COOPATS concept [3] has been conceived. COOPATS’ high-level objective
is to support air traffic controllers, pilots, and all potential ATM users, in all phases of flight by
progressively implementing fully seamless data exchange. The result is improved situational
awareness for both pilot and controller, enabled by intelligent flight-phase dependant services.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the proposed COOPATS services.
The US Distributed Air-Ground Traffic Management (DAG-TM) considers three parties:
pilot, AOC (Airline Operations Centre) and air traffic controller, and defines 14 services. As
these services are not fully defined and validated, for both COOPATS and DAG-TM
considerable evolution in the amount and content of these services is to be expected. This
supports the need for a time-to-market in the order of months to 1 year. An example how
integrated services can benefit noise reduction objectives is Continuous Descent Approach
(CDA) where an aircraft descends with idling engines. Currently this induces capacity loss
because ATM cannot accurately predict the resulting arrival time and has to allow for larger
slots. This noise abatement is not effective, as it is only possible at low traffic densities.
Figure 1 Overview of Co-operative Air Traffic Services (COOPATS)
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2.2 TALIS solution
COOPATS and DAG-TM only consider three parties although actually more parties are
involved as shown in figure 2.
The concurrent enterprise concept is to provide an IT infrastructure enabling a company to
use services provided by other companies to create more advanced services. The success of this
business model in other industries demonstrates its viability. The TALIS (Total Information
Sharing for Pilot Situational Awareness Enhanced by Intelligent Systems) project [4] provides a
supporting architecture for COOPATS and similar concepts and their innovative services. The
TALIS architecture (figure 3) should also integrate the existing systems of yet other actors like
the authorities (figure 2). The authorities are responsible to determine capacity, regulate and
monitor collision risk, noise, emissions and third party risk. The TALIS architecture provides
the middleware to integrate the existing systems. By combining the strengths of the individually
provided services the time-to-market for new services can be reduced significantly and
competitiveness can be increased resulting in better service at lower costs.
ATM
AIRLINE
AUTHORITIES
Noise Capacity
Emission
Risk
AIRPORT
Figure 2 Overview of air transport parties
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By basing the TALIS prototype on Java, services can be uploaded dynamically. Once a
service is certified, immediate fleet-wide deployment can be achieved, reducing the time-to-
market for new services (or products as they are called in references [1] and [2]). As the
concurrent enterprise and Java are COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) products, significant
benefits from exploiting COTS can be accrued. Since the start of the TALIS project, Jini has
been superseded by Openwings, which considerably extends connectivity to many affordable
COTS hardware platforms. For Java work has started on a DO-178B certifiable real-time kernel
in the Open Group [5] in collaboration with the Java Community Process. Once completed this
will reduce the challenge to certify the software implementing new services. TALIS will realise
two services with two iterations plus the infrastructure in 2½ years, demonstrating a time-to-
market of around one-year. The concurrent enterprise facilitates seamless ATM and its
integration into a multimodal transport system. Consequently the TALIS choice for the
concurrent enterprise and COTS solutions pays off.
Figure 3 TALIS architecture
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3 Air transport safety standards
For the various systems and services depicted in figure 3 different safety standards apply,
some of which are discussed below.
3.1 Airborne software safety standard DO-178B
For all software in an aircraft DO-178B [7] applies. As one of the oldest software safety
standards it influenced other software safety standards. Based on the system level FAR/JAR
AC-25-1309 the following five software levels are defined by DO-178B. For convenience in
Table 1 the quantified FAR/JAR failure-probability definition is included.
Table 1: DO-178B/ED12B overview
Level System failure Failure description Probability
description
FAR/JAR
definition
per flight hour
A Catastrophic failure Aircraft loss and/or fatalities Extremely
improbable
          .. < 10-9
B Hazardous /
Severe major
Flight crew can not perform their tasks
Serious or fatal injuries to some occupants
Extremely
remote
10-9 < .. < 10-7
C Major failure Workload impairs flight crew efficiency
Occupant discomfort including injuries
Remote 10-7 < .. < 10-5
D Minor failure Workload within flight crew capabilities
Some inconvenience to occupants
Probable 10-5 < ..
E No effect No effect Not applicable -
DO-178B provides up to 66 detailed requirements, with all required for level A. As it is not
possible to measure actual failure rates at the required low rates, strict process guidance is
provided. Complying with this process is considered sufficient. The excellent air transport
safety record up to date does not repudiate this assumption. Many consider DO-178B as the
toughest standard in the IT industry, which is the reason several real-time operating systems
vendors are certifying their products according to this standard [6]. This reduces the amount of
software needed for an application while increasing the choice of target hardware.
Figure 4 provides an overview of DO-178B software development and certification
process. DO-178B defines an abstract software lifecycle. A developer must map its software
processes onto those required by DO-178B. This is described in a special document called the
Plan of Software Aspects of Certification (PSAC). This document should be negotiated between
the developer and certifying authority prior to actual software development. Subsequently, the
developer needs only to comply with the agreed PSAC. Optional industry standards define the
functions that must exist in certain avionics units (e.g., flight management system).
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Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products are officially allowed by DO-178B, however no
requirements are waived. Consequently, only COTS products that have been developed
specifically taking all DO-178B requirements into account can be used.
Certification involving new software techniques such as object-orientation tends to be
troublesome for the first applicant trying to certify its use since DO-178B tends to trail the
current state-of-the-art in embedded software engineering.
Figure 4: Overview of airborne software safety standard DO-178B
Certification is required from each nation where an airline wants to acquire an aircraft for
civil use. Airbus has obtained its initial 13 type certifications over the last 10 years from the
European Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), complemented by another 13 from the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) plus 130 from other nations. Boeing obtained 200 additional
certificates in the same period, after the initial FAA certification [8]. Substantial benefits can be
accrued when each nation accepts the certifications of all accredited ICAO member states. A
system of accreditation should enforce the standard equally in all nations concerned. Currently
mutual certification recognition involves a lengthy negotiation between the two certifying
authorities involved, leading to a bilateral agreement. Air transport’s good safety record does
not repudiate the claim that DO-178B compliance provides the safety objectives. However,
catastrophic failures (level A) are fortunately so rare, that the absence of software induced
catastrophic failures can not statistically justify compliance to DO-178B requirements. Like all
other software safety standards, evidence on the utility and effectiveness of each of the 66 DO-
178B requirements is lacking. They are based on a consensus on engineering judgement.
3.2 US Air Traffic Management standard DO-278/ED109
For Air Traffic Management (ATM) ground (and satellite) systems, the USA has extended
DO-178B into a new standard DO-278 [9]. Table 2 provides an overview of the six Assurance
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Levels (AL) defined in DO-278. Note that unlike DO-178B, neither a definition of the
assurance levels nor an indication of the allowed failure probability is provided.
In contrast to DO-178B, DO-278 acknowledges the use of independently developed (pre-
existing) COTS, by defining processes for planning, acquisition, verification, configuration
management and quality assurance. It must be demonstrated that unused COTS capabilities do
not adversely effect the ATM system. An important extension to DO-178B is that COTS service
experience may be used, thereby obviating the need to apply a DO-278 compliant development
process for some assurance levels. However, the restrictions on service experience are quite
severe. The information on service experience is included in Table 2. In the table “one year”
means that no failure may occur for a continuous period of 8760 hours of representative use.
Additionally, all in-service reports originating from all users of the COTS have to be evaluated
for their potential adverse effects on the ATM system.
Table 2: DO-278/ED109 overview
DO-178 level DO-278 assurance level COTS service experience
A AL 1 Not allowed
B AL 2 Negotiate with approval authority
C AL 3 One year
AL 4 Six months
D AL 5 Typically not needed
E AL 6 Not applicable
3.3 EUROCONTROL draft Air Traffic Management standard
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) has set up
a safety management software ad hoc task group under the European Air Traffic Management
Programme (EATMP). Based on the EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement
ESARR 4 [10], the task group is drafting a software standard. This, as yet unnamed, standard
will combine DO-178B, IEC 61508, and the Capability Maturity Model [13] into a combined
safety and quality assurance document. The software classification provided in Table 3 has not
yet been fixed. The Standard is based on ESARR4, while inserting an additional level identical
to Level B of DO-178B. The requirements on the evidence that needs to be provided depend on
the assurance level. The standard covers operational use and maintenance phases, an extension
to DO-178B.
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Table 3: EUROCONTROL EATMP software assurance level
Software
assurance
level
ESARR4 severity
(Class, effect)
ESARR 4
occurrence
likelihood
software occurrence likelihood
(operational-hour)
1a 1 Accidents Improbable N/A
1b DO-178B level B N/A DO-178B Extremely Remote 10-9
< ... < 10-7
2 2 Serious incidents Remote 10-6 < ... < 10-5
3 3 Major incidents Occasional 10-5 < ... < 10-4
4 4 Significant incidents Probable 10-4 < ... < 10-3
5 5 No immediate effect on safety N/A N/A
3.4 Electronic flight bag AC 120-76
The electronic flight bag is a COTS-based hardware platform that supports many independent
software applications, possibly even simultaneously. As such the electronic flight bag is well
suited for the airborne part of the TALIS system. The electronic flight bag can be part of the
aircraft and so DO-178B applies. However, it can also be used outside the aircraft, so a special
document on the safety and certification FAA AC120-76 [11] is available. The electronic flight
bag could either be a portable device like a slate laptop or personal digital assistant, or be
installed in the aircraft. The electronic flight bag is classified as a:
• Class 1 portable COTS device without data link connectivity to the aircraft and not
connected to the aircraft power system or an aircraft mount;
• Class 2 portable COTS device mounted to the aircraft, can connect read-only to the aircraft
data link and can connect to Airline Operational Control (AOC) information in
receive/transmit mode;
• Class 3 installed equipment and consequently DO-178B applies in full.
For Class 1 and 2 equipment DO-178B compliance is not required. To illustrate the usefulness
of Class 1 and 2, AC120-76 lists sixty-four sample applications for Class 1 and seventeen for
Class 2. Class 2 mentions Internet connectivity, but for data only. Consequently a key TALIS
requirement like uploading Java applets is prohibited.
Compliance to AC120-76 implies compliance to 103 sections of 5 parts of the US Code of
Federal Regulation (CFR) relating to airworthiness plus 45 additional sections of 4 parts of the
operating regulations. Even within AC120-76, some parts relate to activities performed only
once for the approval of software, while other parts mention an operational approval valid for a
specific operator for a specific period of time. This profusion of standards, regulations, etc, is
typical for integrated systems like TALIS.
The four discussed standards, which are not harmonised and could have different national
interpretations, support the conclusion in [2] that innovation in certification is needed. Although
[2] proposes a shift to process versus current product standards, more objective evidence on the
relevance of the provided test evidence with respect to the safety claims is needed.
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4 Security certification
After the tragic September 11 (2001) events security has become even more of a concern
for air transport. Especially network-enabled systems, like TALIS, are vulnerable to attacks and
hence need protection. The ISO-15408 [12] is an international standard that includes security
requirements and can provide certifications for complying products. Qualified and officially
recognised assessors perform the objective and repeatable evaluation, much like DO-178B for
safety certification. The evaluation can lead to a certificate, which is currently recognised by 16
countries.
The ISO-15408 considers three security objectives aiming to prevent:
• Damaging disclosure of the service to unauthorised recipients (loss of confidentiality);
• Damage through unauthorised modification (loss of integrity);
• Damage through unauthorised deprivation of access to the asset (loss of availability).
Environment
Threats
Security policy
Security
Requirements
(Protection Profile)
(Security Target)
Evidence Assurance
Level
Product Deployment
Security functions
ISO 15408 part 2
Evidence Guidance
Approved and
registered productEvaluation
Software development
process
Figure 5 Overview of security standard ISO 15408
Figure 5 provides an overview of the ISO-15408 view on the realisation of security
functions. The security environment provides the context of the asset. Combined with the
perceived threats and the security policy the security requirements can be derived. These
requirements consist of a reusable Protection Profile (PP) and an asset specific Security Target
(ST). Based on these requirements the security functions of the system are chosen from the
extensive listing of possible security functions in the ISO-15408 Part 2. Separately the
protection level is determined, which determines the amount of implementation effort and
evaluation effort. Table 4 provides an overview of the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs).
The amount of COTS products in the register at the time of writing (May 2003) illustrates that
ISO-15408 is rapidly being accepted.
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Table 4: ISO 15408 Evaluation Assurance Level and number of complying COTS products
# of COTS productsEAL Description
Certified In evaluation
1 Functionally tested, security threats not serious 11 0
2 Structurally tested, low to moderate assurance 19 13
3 Methodically tested and checked, maximum assurance without
infringing sound development practise
16 2
4 Methodically designed, tested and reviewed, maximum assurance
compatible with good commercial practise
40 20
5 Semiformally designed and tested, maximum assurance with
moderate security engineering
1 0
6 Semiformally verified design and tested, protect high value assets
against significant risk
0 0
7 Formally verified design and tested, extremely high risk situations
and/or high assets values
0 0
Total # of COTS products 87 35
ISO-15408 adds further requirements on the software development process, so
harmonisation with the safety requirements is advantageous. As air transport does not have a
tradition is software security certification, it can benefit of the military and commercial domains
through this more advanced standard.
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5 Conclusions
• A century after the first powered flight, air transport is in need of major improvements. Both
Europe (Vision 2020) and the US (Anyone, anytime, anywhere, anywhere) have set
ambitious targets for capacity, safety, environmental issues and flexibility (reduced time-to-
market). To achieve these goals IT is a key enabling technology.
• By deploying the concurrent enterprise concepts and the supporting COTS technology, the
TALIS prototype has demonstrated the technical viability of an IT infrastructure for
seamless ATM involving all actors integrated into a multimodal transport system.
• For non-critical services TALIS has shown the time-to-market can be reduced to a year by
deploying IT innovations like COTS, component technology, connector technology. To
achieve the week/month timeframe further innovation is needed.
• For critical services certification is a major obstacle to achieve the required time-to-market.
The various non-harmonised safety standards compound these problems, as do national re-
certification requirements. Objective evidence linking safety requirements and provided
evidence is needed.
• For security COTS products complemented by an internationally recognised certification
scheme offer an affordable promise to improve air transport.
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EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
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IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
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